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ABSTRACT 
Since nationalizing its oil industry in 1938, Mexico has maintained high levels of fiscal 
dependency on oil revenues. However, oil production in Mexico is quickly declining. In 
fact, oil production levels in 2010 were at their lowest levels in 20 years. Petróleos 
Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico’s state-owned oil monopoly and cash cow, currently 
provides the Mexican government with approximately 40% of its total revenues. Mexican 
oil revenues have long been exploited and mismanaged by successive administrations 
rather than invested in exploration projects, infrastructure modernization, or process 
efficiency improvement. Decades of severe financial constraints placed on Pemex by the 
Mexican government, coupled with a weak corporate culture, have left Pemex unable to 
deal effectively with the oil production crisis at hand. This thesis examines the factors 
that explain why Mexican oil production has dwindled, despite the government’s 
tremendous economic and political incentives to preserve revenues generated by oil rents. 
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Mexico’s oil production is quickly deteriorating. In fact, Mexico’s oil production 
in 2010 was at its lowest level in 20 years.1 Mexico’s state-owned oil monopoly, 
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), which provides the Mexican government with 
approximately 40%2 of its total fiscal income, has long been the government’s cash cow, 
milked of its revenues by successive administrations rather than reinvesting its profits 
into future exploration projects, modernizing infrastructure, or improving process 
efficiency.3 Pemex’s inefficiency, not entirely uncharacteristic of a state-owned 
monopoly, coupled with a weak corporate culture and debilitating bureaucracy, have left 
it unable to deal effectively with the crisis at hand. This predicament, of course, is not 
exclusively a Mexican problem as “few oil-rich countries have the fiscal discipline to 
invest the windfalls prudently, most squander then on wasteful projects.”4 While the 
Mexican government has vowed to invest US$60B into Pemex by 2012 to boost 
production and has almost doubled its exploration budget from US$30B in 2005 to 
US$50B in 2008, efforts have thus far been fruitless as production levels continue to 
decline at an accelerated rate. Thus, despite having tremendous economic and political 
incentives to preserve revenues generated by oil rents, what factors explain Mexico’s 
declining oil production? 
In his final and unfinished book, El Són del Corazón, published 11 years after his 
death in 1921, Mexican poet Ramón López Velarde wrote, “Oh Homeland, the child 
                                                 
1 Lourdes Melgar, “Impact of the Deep Horizon Oil Spill on Mexico’s E&P” (presented at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Energy and National Security Program, Institute of the 
Americas, Washington D.C., August 5, 2010). 
2 Jeremy Martin and Pierre Merzeau, “Taking Stock of Oil and Pemex and Implications of the Gulf 
Spill,” Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 8, no. 3 (2010): 2. 
3 George W. Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 
100. 
4 Michael L. Ross, “Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 
2. 
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Jesus left you a stable/and the Devil left you springs of petroleum.”(23–24).5 While 
Lopez, of course, could not have foreseen the tumultuous dependency on oil rents that his 
future countrymen were to endure, his remarks are no less censoriously ominous. Given 
Mexico’s heavy dependency on oil revenues for public spending and institutional 
development, it comes as no surprising consequence that scholars, such as Terry Lynn 
Karl, argue that Mexico has been transformed it into a petro-state.6 They contend that the 
intertwined political and corporate association between the Mexican state and Pemex has 
created an interdependent culture of monopolistic inefficiency and political 
mismanagement. Luis de la Calle, a Mexican economist and professor at the Instituto 
Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), has gone so far as to describe Mexico’s 
petrol-based economy as, “like Russia: all oil and corruption.”7 This thesis examines and 
evaluates whether Mexico is a petro-state in the present-day and expound on the myriad 
of reasons why Mexican oil production has dwindled despite the government’s high level 
of fiscal reliance on oil rents, in lieu of taxation. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Since the early years of World War II, the United States (U.S.) has come to rely 
heavily on Mexican oil supplies. In fact, initiated by the Bracero program in 1942, 
Mexico became the primary supplier of oil to the United States during the war, even 
allowing U.S. Navy officers to take command of its oil tankers after two of them, the 
Potrero del Llano and the Faja de Oro, were sunk by German U-boats while transporting 
oil to refineries in the United States.8 Despite prior objections to nationalize Mexico’s oil 
industry in the 1930s, the United States soon realized that it was in its own best interest to 
encourage a stable and amicable relationship with Mexico. The strategic importance of 
this relationship amongst neighbors became increasingly obvious as the United States 
                                                 
5 Ramón López Velarde, Song of the Heart: Selected Poems (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 
28. 
6 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 19. 
7 “Getting Bigger,” The Economist, October 2, 2010, Americas section, 42. 
8 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America’s Wars Vol. II: The Age of the Professional Soldier, 1900–2001 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2003), 170. 
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entered further into the war.9 Growing national security concerns, coupled with the need 
to secure a reliable source of petroleum, quickly overshadowed even the most vociferous 
U.S. oil companies and investors, and in 1942, both countries entered into a formal 
alliance against the Axis powers.10 Since then, Mexico has remained a principal source of 
petroleum and is currently the second largest exporter of crude oil to the United States.11 
As a result of this close trade relationship, along with U.S. hegemonic influence, Mexico 
has consistently aligned its trade policies with U.S. interests, even opting not to join the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), even though membership 
would have emphasized Mexican independence from the United States in international 
relations.12 Consequently, Mexico and the United States have enjoyed a mutually 
beneficial relationship where the latter has come to view Mexican crude oil imports as a 
prudent, more amicable alternative to imports from an OPEC member, oil-producing 
country. Conversely, Mexico has come to rely heavily on its proximity to the United 
States as one of its greatest economic assets and competitive advantages, not to mention 
the Mexican state’s dependence on tax revenues generated by Pemex.13 In short, and 
while mutually beneficial in many aspects, this familiar and long-standing relationship 
between the United States and Mexico has also served to fuel Mexico’s fiscal 
dependency on oil revenues and fed the U.S.’s insatiable addiction to oil. 
While Mexico’s petroleum industry and interdependent development have been 
well documented by numerous scholars and publications, its decreasing oil production is 
a rather new phenomenon and has yet only been analyzed by a small number of journals 
and periodicals. This thesis researches, analyzes, and concludes by identifying the  
 
 
                                                 
9 Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 155. 
10 Meyer, The United States and Mexico, 155. 
11 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil and Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries, 2010 
Import Highlights, February 25, 2011. 
12 Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil, 144–145. 
13 Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2008), 2, 18. 
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contributing factors that have led to Mexico’s inability to tap new oilfields effectively 
and meet production expectations, despite having abundant resources in the Gulf of 
Mexico and considerable state reliance on oil-generated revenues. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Two hypotheses can be formulated by analyzing the literature written thus far vis-
à-vis the oil production crisis in Mexico. The first hypothesis employs an institutional 
approach and posits that Mexico’s inability to deal effectively with its waning oil 
production is the result of decades of inefficiency and mismanagement, and has thus, 
conferred upon Mexico the status of a rentier state. This hypothesis contends that existing 
rentier networks in Mexico have shaped the behavior and strategies of both state 
institutions, as well as private parties, consequently throwing the country into a vicious 
cycle where development is dogmatically contingent upon petrodollars.14 Additionally, 
and consistent with other rentier states, Mexico is blatantly negligent in collecting taxes 
from its citizens as there was no need to develop the state tax collection apparatus while 
rents from oil production remained high; thus, exacerbating the fiscal dependency on 
petrodollars.15 This hypothesis further argues that even as the Mexican state attempts to 
reform state policies by constructing and implementing a more coherent bureaucracy, 
these efforts will be largely inadequate at combating the oil crisis “because powerful 
oligopolistic interests will find myriad ways to block the formation of a state apparatus 
that cannot be successfully penetrated by them.”16 
The second hypothesis applies a structural and technological approach. This 
hypothesis explores the contention that oil is a finite and depletable resource. This 
hypothesis examines Hubbert’s “peak oil” theory, which asserts that oil production 
predictably follows a bell-shaped curve. Peak oil contends that Mexico’s waning oil 
production levels are simply indicative of petroleum reserves that have peaked and are 
now on a declining slope (see Figure 1). It should be noted that the term “peak oil” does 
                                                 
14 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 73. 
15 Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 181. 
16 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 240. 
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not imply that the world, or in this analysis of Mexico, is running out of oil; instead it 
insists that an inevitable point in oil production exists at which output can no longer 
increase, and production begins to decline.17 This thesis presents data contrary to 
Hubbert’s peak oil theory, namely by Leonardo Maugeri and Robin Mills, in order to 
illustrate that Mexico’s waning production is, in fact, not consistent with peak oil theory. 
This hypothesis employs a technological approach to answer the question of why Pemex 
is the only operator in the region (Gulf of Mexico) to be experiencing declining 
production while transnational corporations such as Chevron and Royal Dutch Shell 
continue to operate lucrative oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico, just beyond Mexico’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The evaluation of this hypothesis will include a 
technical assessment of Pemex’ technological expertise in order to explain why Pemex 
has been unable to locate and exploit new oilfields in the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
Figure 1. Hubbert’s Peak Theory of World Oil Production18 
                                                 
17 Laurel Graefe, “The Policy Implications of Peak Oil,” in Handbook of Oil Politics, ed. Robert E. 
Looney, Chapter 5 (London: Routledge, forthcoming), 1. 
18 U.S. Department of Energy, Strategic Significance of America’s Oil Shale Resource (March 2004) 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves, 2004), 2. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While a great deal of academic literature analyzes and discusses Mexico’s petro-
state dependent development, little academic literature exists that directly addresses the 
topic of their decreasing productivity, waning reserves, or identifies causality. It is 
important to note that Mexico does, however, stand as a bit of an outlier from other petro-
states, namely OPEC members, in that its oil boom was not the result of oil price hikes, 
but rather of lucrative, and in some cases accidental, oil discoveries.19 In fact, the 
Cantarell oilfield was not discovered until 1976 and not put into production until 1981.20 
Cantarell was Mexico’s largest producer and most abundant source of crude oil from 
1981 until its sudden and unexpected decline in 2005; its significance will be discussed in 
much greater detail in ensuing chapters. Still, however, Mexico suffers from the same 
self-inflicted and exorbitant ratio of debt service to exports and political and economic 
instability as other “capital-deficient” oil exporters, or petro-states.21 
Author George Grayson has discussed and documented, in noteworthy detail, the 
strong correlation between Mexican politics, specifically the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), the oil industry and the often-indistinguishable line between political 
prerogatives and oil-generated revenues. His research provides meticulous background 
information and history regarding the creation of Pemex, its corporate and political 
structure, as well as Mexico’s friendly, yet often strained, relations with the United 
States. It should be noted that Grayson’s research is a bit dated, as it was conducted prior 
to Mexico’s debilitating debt crisis, during the 1980s, and the resulting economic policy 
changes. Still, Grayson should be credited for having addressed and foreseen many of the 
relevant dilemmas facing Mexico’s petroleum industry today, namely the nominal and 
insufficient resources allocated for future exploratory activity.22 While some scholars and 
experts in the field, such as Mario Ramón Beteta, economist and former director general 
                                                 
19 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 18–19. 
20 “The End of Cantarell,” Latin American Regional Report—Mexico and NAFTA, RM-09-10 
(October 2009): 10–11. 
21 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 32. 
22 Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil, 44. 
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of Pemex, and Pamela Falk maintain that no direct correlation exists between the 
resources used for exploration and the results obtained from such efforts.23 Grayson 
expertly counters this point by highlighting that much of Mexico’s production dilemma 
is, in fact, the result of imprecise and unguided exploratory drilling, or what he refers to 
as “wildcat drilling.”24 It will be argued in Chapter III of this thesis that the practice of 
undisciplined “wildcat drilling” continues to plague Pemex’ exploratory operations to 
date. 
Studies submitted by Velasco and Grayson have tackled the issues of corporate 
and political corruption within Mexico vis-à-vis its management of Pemex, as well as 
closely examining the corporate culture and political reach of Pemex executives and oil 
workers union leaders. Velasco goes so far as to deduce that there exists a deep-seated 
interdependency between the oil revenues generated by Pemex and Mexico’s economic 
and political development, which he concludes, endangers Mexico’s continuing political 
stability.25 He continues to add that Mexico has yet to decrease its reliance on Pemex and 
vice versa, and that Pemex operates with a limited degree of autonomy regarding its 
internal decision-making policies and long-term strategies.26 
The most recent and definitive academic literature concerning the depletion of 
hydrocarbons is Robin M. Mills,’ The Myth of the Oil Crisis: Overcoming the Challenges 
of Depletion, Geopolitics, and Global Warming, published in 2008. In it, the author 
contends, using sophisticatedly noteworthy quantitative measures and analysis, that, in 
fact, no such oil depletion crisis exists and effectively debunks Hubbert’s peak oil theory, 
which, as previously stated, argues that the rate of petroleum production tends to follow a 
bell-shaped curve. Mills further asserts that green energy alternatives could displace the 
world’s reliance on fossil fuels. The author also contends that Mexico lacks the funding, 
incentive, and above all, the technological expertise to perform successful exploration 
                                                 
23 Mario Ramón Beteta. “The Role of the Oil Industry in Mexico,” in Petroleum and Mexico’s Future 
ed. Pamela S. Falk (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 70. 
24 Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil, 40. 
25 Jesús Agustín Velasco-S., Impacts of Mexican Oil Policy on Economic and Political Development 
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1982), 202. 
26 Ibid., 20–21. 
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economically.27 However, the author of this thesis argues that Mills’ conclusion, while 
fastidiously supported with empirical and quantitative data, would be increasingly useful 
if it addressed, at least partially, the negative economic and developmental implications 
associated with diminishing oil revenues within a petro-state, as well as the political and 
societal withdrawals from the evaporation of oil rents. Furthermore, Mills does not offer 
recommendations as to how a state is to reform its economic policies and recover lost 
revenues to combat the detrimental economic, political, and societal byproducts 
effectively that have been brought on by dwindling oil production and the loss of their 
associated state revenues. Lastly, it is important to indicate that this thesis has employed 
these sources to provide a historical context of the Mexican oil industry to analyze 
structural and institutional patterns, as well as to highlight the often-indistinguishable line 
between political prerogatives and oil-generated revenues. Hubbert’s peak oil theory and 
contradictory theories will be addressed and evaluated in greater detail in Chapter III of 
this thesis. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the creation and management of Pemex, as well as Mexico’s 
historical trajectory as a petro-state by employing a process tracing methodology. It 
begins with a historical and institutional analysis of Mexico’s oil industry, then identifies 
and evaluates structural and technological factors and shortcomings. Lastly, it addresses 
the current strategies of the Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo (IMP) and Pemex for 
contending with declining oil production, as well as the diminishing prospects for future 
exploration and the discovery of additional Mexican oilfields. This thesis will perform an 
across time analysis of the development of Pemex, focusing almost exclusively on the 
period from the 1970s through the present. It further includes an analysis of structural 
factors, considering the location of currently active oilfields. This thesis examines the 
technological argument that Pemex categorically lacks the technological expertise to tap 
successfully deepwater reserves located along the Mexico’s exclusive economic zone 
along the Gulf of Mexico and evaluates Pemex’ progress with their newly acquired sixth 
                                                 
27 Robin M. Mills, The Myth of the Oil Crisis: Overcoming the Challenges of Depletion, Geopolitics, 
and Global Warming (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2008), 65. 
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generation deepwater oilrig, Centenario, for geophysical exploration. Additionally, it 
examines Mexico’s highly criticized and tepid energy sector reform, which would allow 
for limited contractual partnerships with foreign firms for the development of deepwater 
oilfields.28 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II examines the historical and political institutional background regarding 
the creation of Pemex, referencing the nationalization of Mexico’s petroleum industry by 
President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938, to include a brief analysis of the prerogatives 
conferred on the state by the Constitution of 1917. It should be noted that this section of 
the chapter, 1930s through 1960s, solely serves in a prefatory function. The thesis 
analytical focus is on the Mexico/Pemex association since the 1970s, namely since the 
discovery of the world’s second-largest producing oil field (Cantarell) in 1976 through 
the present day oil production crisis in Mexico. Chapter II is divided into four 
subsections, each corresponding to and focusing on oil sector and associated policy 
during a six-year presidential term, or sexenio, from 1976 through 2000. Chapter II is 
organized by subsections in order to more clearly present and focus on examining the 
historical context that led to Mexico’s development as a petro-state up to the 1980s, as its 
dependency on oil revenues for economic and political development were prevalent 
during this period. Additionally, Chapter II examines the structural aspects of Mexico’s 
oil industry, namely the locations of large oil fields and the fact that most oil fields in use 
today are easily accessible with minimal drilling. This chapter explores the intertwined 
political and corporate cultures of the Mexican government and Pemex to derive and 
highlight the interdependent culture of monopolistic inefficiency, political 
mismanagement, and economic exploitation during this period. The last subsection of 
Chapter II briefly discusses the introduction of the nuevo peso in 1993 and its ensuing 
devaluation, referred to as the “December Mistake” (see Figure 2), due to a shift in 
Mexican monetary policy from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate. This 
devaluation serves to highlight further the relationship between oil rents and politics in 
                                                 
28 “Production Problems,” Latin American Regional Report—Mexico and NAFTA, RM-09-02 
(February 2009): 8. 
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Mexico. Additionally, this subsection discusses the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections, 
which marked a transition of regimes and effectively ended the reign of single party 
politics in Mexico. It addresses why democratization and a political party shift has failed 
to improve efficiency within Pemex, has not increased the government’s ability or 
willingness to levy or collect individual income taxes, nor reduced the government’s 
dependency on oil generated revenues for public spending. The intent of this chapter is to 
focus on identifying patterns of institutional and developmental shortcomings in Mexico 
with regard to its oil industry, and their causes. Chapter II concludes by assessing the 
institutional impact that the “accidental” discovery of the Cantarell oil field in 1976, the 
second-largest producing oil complex in the world until 2006, has had on Mexico and 
Pemex, as well as evaluating the consequences of “easy oil” and the resulting booming 
oil rents.29 
Chapter III analyzes whether dwindling production levels are due to the naturally 
occurring depletion of a finite resource, per Hubbert’s peak oil theory, or if they are the 
result of inadequate drilling infrastructure and technological prowess on the part of 
Pemex. It assesses the current state of “Mexico’s piggybank,”30 Pemex, and waning 
production levels by considering Mexico’s current and future drilling prospects as 
compared to other nationally owned petroleum companies operating in the region. 
Chapter III evaluates whether Mexico can still be considered a petro-state, as some 
authors have contended, by examining the reliance on oil revenues by the Mexican state 
over time, and proportionate to their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Additionally, it 
addresses Mexico’s growing security concerns and the implications associated with its 
weakening economy, while identifying correlations between state deficiencies and lost oil 
revenues. Lastly, it evaluates Mexico’s recent, 2008, attempts to reform their energy 
sector and explains why they have been largely unable to pass legislation allowing for the 
reformation of the oil sector and how a political stalemate has ultimately dashed any 
prospect of passing any meaningful reform during Calderón’s sexenio. 
                                                 
29 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 18–19. 
30 Manuel Pérez-Rocha, “The Future of Mexico’s Oil,” Global Exchange, June 17, 2008, 
http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/mexico/5762.html. 
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This thesis concludes in Chapter IV with a summary of significant findings and 
analysis of relevant facts and theories presented in the previous chapters regarding 
Mexico’s petroleum industry. The concluding chapter utilizes elements of institutional, 
structural, and technological theories to deduce the explanation, and moreover, the 
relevance, of Pemex’s declining oil production levels and the subsequent loss of 
associated oil generated government revenues. 
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II. MEXICO: THE PRI YEARS—A TALE OF CLIENTELISM 
AND CORPORATISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II serves to provide a historical context with regard to the creation of 
Pemex in 1938 through Mexico’s democratization period of the 1990s. This chapter the 
developmental and institutional variances between authoritarian and democratic rentier 
states, and why these variances matter in the case of Mexico. More specifically, it 
contrasts the institutional tendencies within a single party system, as was the case in 
Mexico during this time period, against those of fully democratic regimes. Additionally, 
it addresses the clientelistic and corporatist structures vis-à-vis the state and oil revenues 
during this period, to include large-scale corporate and political corruption, under the 
reign of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). This chapter historically 
examines Mexico’s institutional development vis-à-vis Pemex, as well as the structural 
factors that have influenced Mexico’s oil policy. This thesis argues that factors have, in 
fact, retarded Mexico’s ability to deal effectively with the crisis of lost oil production. 
Chapter II is further divided into four subsections, each corresponding to a six-year 
presidential term, sexenio, from 1976 through 2000. These subsections address the 
aforementioned corporatist structure of the Mexican state and Pemex during respective 
presidential terms. It concludes with a brief synopsis of its principal aim of providing a 
historical context in order to more clearly examine this thesis’ hypotheses and proceed to 
evaluating contemporary conditions addressed in the ensuing chapter. 
B. THE BIRTH OF PEMEX 
No dialogue vis-à-vis the Mexican oil industry would be complete without first 
historically prefacing the nationalization of Mexico’s oil industry and the subsequent 
creation of Pemex. In a national radio address on March 18, 1938, Mexican President 
Lázaro Cárdenas, incapacitated by national oil strikes and increasing hostilities between 
Mexican workers and U.S., British, and Dutch oil companies, publically decreed that 
“¡El petróleo es nuestro!—The oil is ours!” Cárdenas immediately expropriated all 
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foreign oil firm assets and terminated all foreign drilling and exploration in Mexico, 
altogether forcing out foreign oil interest and investment from Mexico.31 Employing the 
prerogatives conferred on the state by Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and 
his incontestable presidential power, Cárdenas formed Pemex as a nationally owned, 
nationally run industry. Shortly after expropriation, Cárdenas offered to compensate the 
affected parties for lost machinery and infrastructure. Once an agreed upon value could 
be determined, submission of payment was to be made within a 10-year period and 
preferably paid for in oil. Every affected U.S. corporation with the exception of the 
Sinclair Oil Company, which agreed to an US$8.5M indemnification, indignantly refused 
such offers, proclaiming it nothing more than “payment in their oil” and continued to 
petition the U.S. State Department to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on 
Mexico.32 Despite this considerable pressure from Washington and foreign oil firms, that 
all but demanded the resumption of private capital investment and direction within 
Pemex, Mexican authorities decided that their oil industry would remain part of the 
public sector to be run as a state monopoly.33 “This expropriation measure had become 
the touchstone of economic independence for Mexico: from then on, it became 
increasingly difficult for foreign enterprises to return to Mexico except in a subordinate 
role.”34 It is worth noting, however, that in April 1942, after the United States had 
formally entered into WWII, the U.S. State Department successfully negotiated for the 
fair compensation of expropriated materials from U.S. oil firms with Mexico’s newly 




                                                 
31 Jeremy Martin, “Oil in Mexico and United States Energy Security: A Tale of Symbiosis,” Journal 
of Energy Security (ENSEC) (January 2010): 1. 
32 Meyer, The United States and Mexico, 151. 
33 George Phillips, “The Political Constraints on Economic Policy in Post-1982 Mexico: The Case of 
Pemex,” Bulletin for Latin American Research 18, no. 1 (1999): 38. 
34 Meyer, The United States and Mexico, 150. 
35 Ibid., 156. 
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Since expropriation, March 18 has become a celebrated federal holiday and 
Cárdenas a national hero, concretely illustrating the symbiotic relationship between 
Mexico and its oil industry; further cementing the embodiment of Pemex as a pillar of 
Mexican nationalism. “In Mexico oil is not merely a chemical compound but rather a 
fundamental element of sovereignty. Simply put, oil is part of the national DNA.”36  
C. PEMEX’ INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER SINGLE PARTY 
AUTHORITARIANISM: 1938–1976 
Institutions inherently develop and behave differently under authoritarianism than 
they do under democracy.37 The protection of property and independent legal rights are 
more likely to be established within a competitive political system. Since all political 
actors within a democratic system realize that their respective parties will not have 
control of the executive or be running government permanently, they will look to protect 
themselves by institutionalizing the rule of law for periods when the opposition is in 
control.38 Furthermore, and specific to the energy sector, actors within a democratic 
political system will seek to institutionalize effective energy policies that promote 
competition in exploration and production in order to maximize process efficiency and oil 
revenues. In doing so, political actors will be in a better position to satisfy their 
constituencies by erecting and financing public goods with oil rents.39 Additionally, the 
political imperative to recompense constituents with public goods procured with oil rents 
within an openly competitive political arena makes it less likely that political leaders will 
attempt to make a grab for maximum short-term oil rents as a competitive system 
incentivizes long-term authority. Also, “an independent and effective regulator is more 
likely to be established if the political system is competitive.”40 The creation of an 
autonomous regulatory agency for the energy sector is essential for cultivating 
                                                 
36 Martin, “Oil in Mexico and United States Energy Security: A Tale of Symbiosis,” 1. 
37 Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 191. 
38 David R. Mares, “Resource Nationalism and Energy Security in Latin America: Implications for 
Global Oil Supplies,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (January 2010): 18–
19. 
39 Ibid., 18. 
40 Ibid., 19. 
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independent industry growth and promoting fiscal transparency, as it explicitly moderates 
rent appropriation and distribution by political actors or technocratic elites. Lastly, 
leaders within a fully democratic construct are generally more likely to implement more 
progressive and innovative policies, and are more apt to undertake economically risky 
endeavors. As such high risk/high reward strategies, if successfully executed, are likely to 
win the favor of the electorate, while continued stagnant economic growth because of 
overly risk-averse governmental policy can direct impatient, self-interested voters to the 
opposition in search of more fruitful results.41 
Such advantageous institutionalizations were not constructed in Mexico’s oil 
industry under a single party regime. Instead, the existing single party, authoritarian 
government “saw democracy as a threat to be feared rather than a reward to be won and it 
sought above all to maintain unity within the elite.”42 Consequently, ensuing political 
administrations through the 1970s in Mexico, all under the single party regime of the 
PRI, managed Pemex to minimize political risks rather than to maximize profits or 
process efficiency. Throughout this period, Pemex was managed in a manner only 
“efficient enough to avoid disaster or major scandal, but operated as a largely closed 
community with self-imposed, often self-defeating, policies and limitations.”43 Time and 
again, Mexican leaders incessantly chose to endorse institutional initiatives and reforms, 
with regard to Pemex, that were politically palatable rather than actually necessary for 
promoting energy sector growth and modernization.44  
 
 
                                                 
41 Phillips, “The Political Constraints on Economic Policy in Post-1982 Mexico: The Case of Pemex,” 
37. 
42 Ibid., 38. 
43 Ibid., 38–40. 
44 Lourdes Melgar, “Energy Transition: A Path Toward Sustainable Development in Mexico,” Latin 
American Policy 1, no. 1 (2010): 100. 
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D. LOS SEXENIOS: 1976–2000 THE SHIFT TO DEMOCRATIZATION 
1. José López Portillo (1976–1982) 
En el mundo de la economía los paises se dividen en dos: los que tienen 
petróleo y los que no lo tienen. ¡Y nosotros lo tenemos!—In the world of 
economics, countries are divided in two: those that have oil and those that 
do not. And we have it!45 
A fortuitous combination of geological discoveries and international economic 
factors during the presidency of José López Portillo allowed Mexico to develop into one 
of the world’s leading petroleum exporters. While Mexico’s oil production levels and 
subsequent revenues skyrocketed as oil prices soared during the “oil boom” of the late 
1970s and early 1980s (see Figure 2), oil production more than doubled between 1979 
and 1980 alone, Pemex actually saw its financial standing depreciate.46 This deterioration 
was mostly due to the exorbitant state taxation of Pemex, which increased exponentially 
between 1977 and 1981 (see Table 1), and the limited earnings generated from domestic 
sales of state-discounted petrol, which at the time accounted for half of Pemex’s total 
output. The combination of artificially low domestic prices coupled with high taxation 
was a tactic utilized by the government, specifically the ruling party, as a means of 
wielding political control over Pemex. The exertion of political control over Pemex 
during this period was, more specifically, directed at their Director General, Jorge Diaz 
Serrano (1976–1981), who had repeatedly vocalized his presidential ambitions for the 
1982 election.47 This financial stranglehold placed upon Pemex by the PRI ultimately 
forced the organization to fund infrastructure investment and oil exploration with 
international debt. Given Pemex’ position as a major, globally recognized corporation, 
the Mexican government purposely diverted investment capital away from Pemex, via 
exorbitant corporate taxation, as it was assumed that Pemex could borrow at a better rate 
than could other state agencies.48 
 
                                                 
45 José López Portillo, 1981. 
46 Ibid., 39. 
47 Ibid. 




Figure 2. Real Crude Oil Prices 1950–2010 (in U.S. dollars)49 
 
Table 1.   Pemex’ Profit and Loss (P&L) Statement 1977–1981 (in U.S. dollars m)50 
                                                 
49 Laurel Graefe, “The Policy Implications of Peak Oil.” 
50 Gabriel Székely, La Economía Política del Petróleo en México 1976–1982 (México: El Colegio de 
México, 1983), 123. 
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In 1976, Mexico discovered an oil goldmine along an inlet of the Gulf of Mexico 
known as the Bay of Campeche. The discovery of the supergiant51 Cantarell oil field, 
named for the fisherman who accidentally discovered it by laying his fishing nets across 
oil deposits bubbling to the surface, mustered in the golden age of Mexico’s oil industry 
with the lure of “easy oil.”52 The Cantarell field is located in the shallow waters just off 
the coast in the Bay of Campeche and is the world’s third-largest oil field ever discovered 
in terms of volume and was the second-largest producer in the world until 2006, 
producing 2.1 million barrels per day at its peak.53 Whether this momentous discovery is 
a blessing or a tragedy has yet to be decided.54 However, what is clear is that the 
seemingly inexhaustible production and subsequent bonanza of revenues spared Mexico 
and its oil giant Pemex from having to address the myriad of inefficiencies and corruption 
within its operational and managerial ranks. Additionally, because Cantarell’s treasure is 
located in shallow waters and is easily accessible (some areas barely required drilling), 
Pemex was allowed to carry on with business as usual throughout this period rather than 
developing best business practices, acquiring updated machinery, or sharpening its 
technological expertise like other oil companies were forced to do in order to remain 
competitive. Furthermore, since Cantarell was a naturally highly pressurized oil field, 
Pemex was able to drill literally hundreds of shallow wells into the ocean floor, stand 
back and watch as production soared.55 Ultimately, Pemex was able to employ low-tech, 
inexpensive techniques and still maximize productivity output. This upsurge in oil 
productivity in spite of minimal capital investment consequently substantiated and further 
incentivized increased taxation by the PRI, as Pemex’ production levels were not 
negatively affected by their lack of capital funding or innovation. Concomitantly, as oil 
prices and production levels exploded so did the government’s dependency on oil rents. 
Petroleum constituted a considerable portion of the Mexican economy throughout the 
                                                 
51 Defined as an oilfield that holds 5 billion or more barrels of recoverable oil. 
52 Martin and Merzeau, “Taking Stock of Oil and Pemex and Implications of the Gulf Spill,” 2. 
53 Martin, “Oil in Mexico and United States Energy Security: A Tale of Symbiosis,” 3. 
54 Rossana Fuentes Berain, “Petreóleo en México: Pozo de Pasiones. El Debate sobre la Propuesta de 
Reforma Energética” (paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico 
Institute, Washington, D.C., November 14, 2008): 2. 
55 Ibid. 
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López Portillo administration; oil consistently accounted for about 19% of the nation’s 
GDP, constituted for upwards of 60% of Mexico’s total exports and almost 50% of the 
government’s revenue during his presidency.56 This period of historic growth and 
prosperity for Mexico, namely as a result of Mexico’s massive oil wealth, was perfectly 
and succinctly captured when President López Portillo exclaimed in a speech, “¡Vamos a 
administrar la abundancia!—“We are going to manage the abundance!” The negative, 
and lasting, affects of Cantarell’s “easy oil” will be examined in further detail in Chapter 
III of this thesis. Additionally, the ensuing chapter of this thesis addresses Pemex’ 
bloated workforce as compared to its counterparts, namely Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. 
(Petrobras), as an example of its inefficiency and mismanagement. 
Lastly, it is also worth noting that corruption within Pemex was especially 
rampant under the leadership of Director General Jorge Diaz Serrano, who resigned in 
1981 once it had become clear that President López Portillo would not entertain his 
political aspirations. It was customary at the time for the incumbent president to handpick 
his successor, a highly politicized practice known as el dedazo, a decree that was usually 
bestowed upon the incumbent’s favorite cabinet member or political ally, and not 
necessarily upon the most qualified candidate. Only two years after resigning his post at 
Pemex, Diaz Serrano was sentenced to 10 years in jail for embezzlement and ordered to 
pay the Mexican Government US$54 million for losses suffered from unauthorized spot 
market sales.57 As a result of this corruption, oil exports were tightly controlled by a 
newly created secretarial commission under the purview of the Secretaría de Energía, 
Minas e Industria Paraestatal (SEMIP), Secretariat of Energy, Mines, and State-Owned 
Industry. This agency would later become a substantially politicized obstacle that 
“proved too bureaucratic to be able to respond swiftly to changing market conditions.”58 
 
                                                 
56 “Mexico: From Boom to Bust,” The Economist, February 11, 1989. 
57 Dan Williams, “Ex-Pemex Chief Gets 10 Years for Fraud,” Los Angeles Times, May 8, 1987, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-05-08/news/mn-2819_1_diaz-serrano. 
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2. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982–1988) 
After the embarrassing revelations of deep-seated corruption within Pemex as a 
result of Diaz Serrano’s highly publicized criminal trial, Mexico’s newly elected 
president Miguel de la Madrid promised a ‘moral renovation’ of Pemex but soon found it 
more politically advantageous to embrace an exceedingly cautious approach toward 
reforming Pemex’s internal policies in order to avoid conflict with party leaders and slow 
Mexico’s impending democratization.59 During his administration, Pemex’ financial 
situation became increasingly fragile, as it was no longer able to rely on debt finance for 
infrastructure projects and exploration in the face of Latin America’s debt crisis of the 
1980s, or what is commonly referred to as “the lost decade.” For the remainder of his 
term, the de la Madrid government further slashed Pemex’s infrastructure and exploratory 
investment capital, and instead diverted surplus funds to cope with and repay mounting 
debt in an attempt to offset the damaging effects of the country’s debt crisis. 
Moreover, in an attempt to maintain the elevated oil prices of the early 1980s (see 
Figure 2), the de la Madrid government broke from its long-standing U.S. centric energy 
policies and encouraged greater collaboration and solidarity with OPEC nations. In 
accordance with OPEC recommendations and formalized pacts, Mexico purposely 
reduced its oil production in an effort to raise oil prices. However, Mexico continuously 
found itself at the losing end of the prisoner’s dilemma game;60 honoring its production 
limits while other OPEC nations failed to comply, thus dropping the price of oil and 
exacerbating the biting effects of the ongoing debt crisis.61 
                                                 
59 Phillips, “The Political Constraints on Economic Policy in Post-1982 Mexico: The Case of Pemex,” 
42. 
60 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines Prisoner’s Dilemma as a puzzle that illustrates a 
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For the remainder of his presidential term, the de la Madrid government continued 
imposing a heavy tax burden on Pemex. In fact, at a 1988 director’s meeting, Pemex’s 
Director General Francisco Rojas revealed that Pemex’s operating budget in 1989 was, in 
real terms, less that it was in 1973 even though the company was producing 
approximately 15 times more oil than in 1973. “The Mexican government was willing to 
sacrifice the growth which might have been achievable had Pemex been allowed to invest 
more, in return for enjoying some short-term fiscal advantages.”62 Rather than 
reinvesting oil revenues back into drilling infrastructure or exploration, an advantageous 
use of public funds, the Mexican government instead carelessly pursued costly public 
works projects, such as an ill-fated nuclear energy program. Such behavior is consistent 
with Ross’ contention that “few oil-rich countries have the fiscal discipline to invest the 
windfalls prudently, most squander them on wasteful projects.”63 Arguably, this heavy 
tax burden and severe budgetary constraints also impacted Pemex’ industrial safety 
capacity, as it experienced a considerable spike in industrial calamities during this period. 
As a result, Pemex, starved of working capital, was left with little incentive to improve 
efficiency, as any resulting additional revenue surplus was sure to be taxed away by the 
state. 
3. Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) 
The Salinas de Gortari sexenio was period of rather intense market-oriented 
reform and liberalization in Mexico. In 1988, the newly elected president, Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari, was initially more willing than his predecessor to challenge the logic of long-
standing energy policy and push for market-oriented reform in the oil sector. He was 
even able to successfully deregulate the petrochemical sector, allowing for private 
investment.64 Mexico privatized a great many national industries previously owned by 
the state during the presidential term of Salinas de Gortari. In fact, when he took office, 
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Mexico had some 600 state owned industries, and by the end of his sexenio, it only had 
250. Salinas de Gortari successfully privatized the Mexican banking system, a television 
station (now TV Azteca), and the telephone monopoly Telmex. It is worth noting, 
however, that the privatization of most these state owned industries was a highly 
clientelistic and corrupt process, and could be more accurately described as crony 
capitalism. 
However, despite a considerable push for oil sector privatization by two key 
Salinas advisors, Pedro Aspe Armella the Finance Minister and José Córdoba Montoya 
the president’s right hand, the Salinas administration soon decided that oil and gas sector 
deregulation and privatization was too politically contentious an issue.65 Given that 
democratization appeared imminent, the Salinas administration could not risk gift-
wrapping the presidency for the opposition and decided, instead, that the oil and gas 
sector would remain emphatically under public purview. While unable to privatize 
Pemex, Salinas did, however, slash its labor force nearly in half, from 210,000 in 1988 to 
107,000 by the end of his term. Additionally, Salinas successfully exercised his 
unrestrained presidential purview to appreciably weaken the Pemex’ labor union, 
Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana (STPRM), even ordering 
the arrest of their union leader on charges of a racketeering and murder.66 Throughout his 
presidency, Salinas maintained financial constraints on Pemex by continuing to tax their 
profits heavily (see Table 2). The Mexican government continued to manage Pemex’ 
associated in a highly risk averse manner. This risk averse strategy and orientation by the 
government with regard to their oil industry ultimately proved counterproductive, even 
self-defeating, as political and technocratic elites, who were now presented with real 
democratic competition at the executive and gubernatorial level, failed to reform the 
sector and were ultimately unable to provide continued economic benefits to the 
populace.67 During this period, however, Mexico was able to pursue effectively other, 
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more lucrative economic opportunities with the signing of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Mexico successfully exploited their close proximity 
to U.S. markets as one of their most valuable economic competitive advantages and, as a 
result, were consequently able to substantially reduce their economic dependency on oil 
exports and revenues as their principal economic resource. It should be noted, however, 
that while the state’s reliance on oil exports and revenues for economic growth was 
largely reduced, oil politics became no less contentious of a topic particularly as an 
election approached. 
In 1994, litigious oil politics and the threat of democracy became uniquely 
genuine when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas, 
announced his candidacy for the presidency under the newly minted, left-wing political 
party, Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, not 
surprisingly given his familial lineage, built much of his political platform around oil 
nationalism. He was extremely critical of oil deregulation reform initiatives in Mexico, 
calling for the end of foreign drilling contracts and for further exploration to be carried 
out exclusively by Pemex. As a result of mounting political pressure exerted on the PRI, 
the Salinas government quickly withdrew from its pursuit of oil sector reforms and 
liberalization. “This fundamental political reality continues to affect development of the 
nation’s huge oil resource potential by restricting private–particularly foreign–
investment.”68 While this political repositioning paid political dividends, at least in the 
short run, as the PRI was able to maintain control of the executive by winning the 1994 
election while Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas placed a disappointing third, it is arguable in this 
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  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total Sales $13.6 $15.8 $19.6 $19.4 $25.1 $28.7 $29.7 
Gross Profit $6.4 $9.0 $11.3 $10.8 $14.6 $15.0 $17.2 
Government 
Taxes $5.9 $7.7 $9.9 $9.8 $13.5 $14.0 $16.3 
Net Income $0.5 $0.3 $1.4 $1.0 $1.1 $1.0 $1.0 
Taxes as a 
Percentage of 
Gross Profits 92% 86% 88% 91% 92% 93% 95% 
Table 2.   Pemex’ gross revenues, taxation, and net income, 1988–1994 
(in U.S. dollars bn)69 
4. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1994–2000) 
By all accounts, the 1994 presidential election of PRI candidate Ernesto Zedillo 
Ponce de León was an undisputed free and fair election. This was arguably the first such 
election that Mexico had experienced in some years and marked a shift to democratic 
politics at the executive. In December 1994, after only a few days in office, the newly 
elected president and Ivy League educated economist, converted Mexico’s monetary 
policy from a fixed exchanged rate—pegged to the U.S. dollar - to an open exchange rate. 
Zedillo allowed the nuevo peso, which had been artificially inflated and tightly controlled 
by the outgoing Salinas administration, float freely in open exchange markets. While 
economically sound, this shift in monetary policy proved to be politically disastrous for 
the inexperienced politician and his cabinet, as the peso was devalued by nearly 50% in 
only a matter of days. Coined “The December Mistake” by the outgoing Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari, this devaluation had negative economic implications as far reaching as South 
America, namely the Southern Cone, where it became kiddingly referred to as “The 
Tequila Effect.” U.S. President Bill Clinton attempted to revive the peso with a $50B 
loan to Mexico to little avail, a courtesy not extended to the Southern Cone states. 
Zedillo’s term was marred by numerous monetary gaffes and subsequent currency 
depreciations. These political blunders arguably sparked the unraveling of the once 
prominent PRI party and ushered in rising political opposition, both from within the PRI 
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and outside it, thus allowing rival parties the first legitimate opportunity to challenge for 
the presidency.70 During his presidency, Mexico experienced a harsh recession, namely 
sparked by a debilitating dip in crude oil prices in the late 1990s when prices fell below 
US$9 (see Figure 2). While a combination of the recession, record low oil prices, and 
NAFTA had served to further instigate a change in Mexican oil policy and decreased 
their dependence on oil as a primary export, it should be noted that the Mexican 
government leaned increasingly on Pemex as a source of tax income during this period, 
thus contracting Pemex’ already anemic operating budget.71 Unlike his predecessors, 
Zedillo was no longer afforded the luxury simply avoiding or ignoring politically 
contentious issues under the pressure of democratization; thus he was neither able to 
reform Mexico’s energy policy nor seriously consider privatization.  
 
 
Figure 3. Nuevo Peso Exchange Rate Against U.S. Dollar Since Inception.72 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The unprecedented transfer of executive power from the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), which ruled uncontested for nearly 70 years, to the Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN) in 2000, served as a clear indicator of the democratization of Mexico’s 
political system. However, this democratization has also served as a gradually sobering 
wake up call for many Mexicans amid the realization that the presidency has, in fact, 
been severely weakened. Gone are the days when the president, referred to as the 
tlatoani—Aztec for ruler, commanded undisputed dominance and unreservedly exercised 
his free will over the Mexican political landscape. “The problem is no longer too much 
power in the hands of the president, but too much power seized by those who want to 
sabotage and constrain him.”73 Additionally, the widespread perception that the shift to 
democratic rule brought with it only negligible change left many Mexicans impatient 
with democracy; as disappointment and disillusionment became part of the daily 
vernacular used to describe their political sentiments.74 In fact, since the inaugural 
Latinobarómetro poll was taken in 1995, Mexico has consistently ranked as the least 
satisfied with how democracy works in their country. Only approximately 11% of 
respondents in the 1995 poll answered that they were “very satisfied” or “somewhat 
satisfied” with democracy in their country. Purely as a reference, according to the most 
recent Latinobarómetro poll conducted in 2010, Mexicans rank last in Latin America in 
terms of their satisfaction with democracy in their country.75 The current paralysis of 
democracy is analyzed in Chapter III. 
In the end, history matters. While the future is not preordained by decisions made 
in the past nor do these decisions necessarily set states on a path dependent course, past 
decisions do, however, limit their prospects and forge their environment. This chapter has 
illustrated and examined how institutional dynamics (authoritarianism and 
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democratization) and structural factors (ease of accessibility to oil fields) have affected 
and shaped Mexico’s petroleum sector. This chapter has provided a historical context 
from which to proceed. The ensuing chapter provides an in depth analysis of Mexico’s oil 
production crisis as it currently stands, to include a comparative analysis of how Pemex’ 
production levels, process efficiency, and deepwater drilling capabilities and technologies 
compare to other state-owned petroleum companies in the region, specifically Petróleo 
Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) and Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). 
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III. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES: OIL WANES AND 
DEMOCRACY PARALYZES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and analyzes Mexico’s contemporary challenges vis-à-vis 
its oil sector. Having established the historical context of the nationalization of Mexico’s 
oil industry, as well as introduced various institutional and structural factors concerning 
the institutional development of Pemex in Chapter II, this chapter evaluates how those 
factors have influenced or lead, at least in part, to the current crisis. This chapter further 
addresses the hypothesis that the Mexican dilemma is not consistent with Hubbert’s peak 
oil theory, and is therefore attributable to other factors that will be explored throughout 
this chapter. The chapter then focuses on Mexico’s recent push for deepwater76 and 
ultradeep water77 drilling technology techniques to be employed along the Gulf of 
Mexico. It provides a comparative analysis of Pemex’ deepwater projects and operational 
efficiency against those of other transnational corporations and nationally owned 
companies (NOCs) operating in the region. It addresses growing concerns regarding the 
security implications of Mexico’s current state as related to external economic factors. 
Lastly, it evaluates how recent energy sector reform initiatives have been brought to a 
standstill by political maneuvering and democratic paralysis. 
B. HUBBERT’S PEAK OIL THEORY AND CONTRASTING 
COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Dr. M. King Hubbert’s peak oil theory employs a quantitative method that relies 
on a mathematical curve, commonly referred to as Hubbert’s curve, which is not entirely 
unlike a bell curve. This theory predicts that oil reserve extraction and production levels 
will inherently follow along this curve, peaking then rapidly declining, as oil is a finite 
and depletable material. His theory further contends that once 50% of a region’s reserves 
are produced, that production levels will begin to decline at an accelerated rate. While, 
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77 Defined as drilling conducted at water depths as great as 3,000 meters. 
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Hubbert’s theory was successfully employed in the 1950s and 1960s for predicting oil 
production in the United States, gaining Hubbert considerable notoriety in his field. This 
theory has been the source of a highly contentious and ongoing debate since its 
introduction. 
The considerable debate vis-à-vis peak oil persists to the present day, as numerous 
scholars and oil industry leaders, such as Robin Mills and Leonardo Maugeri, have 
altogether disregarded peak oil theory. Author Robin Mills discounts this theory as 
invalid and ineffectual, as, she contends, numerous governments and corporations have 
employed Hubbert’s curve to mostly false predictions. “Hubbert’s genius (or luck) is that 
he is the only person to have made a correct quantitative prediction of oil depletion using 
this method; to the United Kingdom, the world, or wherever, all else who have applied it 
have been egregiously wrong.”78 Leonardo Maugeri goes so far as to discount peak 
theory as mere fantasy and suggests that undiscovered oil reserves are plentiful and will 
continue to be exploited as new extractive technologies are introduced, as new 
technology will serve to make currently impracticable and cost-prohibitive wells more 
easily accessible.79 He further asserts that global energy demand will peak before global 
supply does.80 However, weight should also be given to the counterargument that it is not 
entirely prudent to rely on the assumption that some future technology will be able to 
efficiently provide for energy demands.81 It should additionally be noted, however, that 
present-day estimates of the world’s undiscovered conventional petroleum deposits are 
ambiguous, at best. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates these reserves at 
between 0.4 trillion and 1.2 trillion barrels.82  
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C. CANTARELL DECLINES, PEMEX SCRAMBLES 
Beginning in 2004, Mexico is experiencing a period of sharp production decline, 
primarily due to the acute drop-off in production of the Cantarell oil field (see Figure 4). 
While it is worth noting that Cantarell is not Mexico’s only substantial oil field, the 
850,000 barrels per day currently produced at the Ku Maloob Zaap (KMZ) field, 
Mexico’s largest source of new production, pale in comparison to the 2.1M barrels per 
day that Cantarell produced at its peak.83 “Cantarell’s development ultimately suffered 
from an almost perfect storm of mismanagement due to inefficient technology, 
insufficient capital budgets, and intense pressure to produce as much oil as possible 
thereby maximizing its rent for the federal government.”84 It is additionally worth noting 
that Cantarell’s drop in production cannot be solely attributed to the inevitable ends of 
simply having reached its peak, as Hubbert would argue; much can also be accredited to 
Pemex’s antiquated infrastructure, which is a direct result of decades of fiscal 
strangulation by the Mexican government. Case in point, when Cantarell, a naturally 
highly pressurized field, began losing internal pressure as a result of an overly perforated 
surface (literally hundreds of wells), Pemex employed a widely employed industry 
process known as nitrogen injection to maintain positive pressure within the field and 
continue pumping at elevated rates. However, an unintended consequence of this process 
was the intrusion of saltwater into the reservoir. This intrusion of saltwater did, in fact, 
further decrease the production levels at Cantarell, as Pemex lacked basic water-
separation equipment and was unable to obstruct the influx of saltwater.85 The loss of 
production due to a categorical lack of basic equipment and infrastructure is yet another 
consequence of the financial constraints placed on Pemex by the Mexican government. 
As a noteworthy contrast, the Saudis have recently begun purposely pumping saltwater 
into the Ghawar oil field, the world’s largest producing field, to maximize production; 
contrastingly what is a hindrance to one is a tool for another. 
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Figure 4. Mexican Crude Oil Production, 1990–2010 (thousand barrels per day)86 
Significant technological advances and innovations, particularly in the latter part 
of the 20th century, have provided present-day oil companies the ability to explore and 
develop oil wells located deep beneath the ocean floor. Modern-day oilrigs are capable of 
drilling thousands of meters below the ocean floor. These technological advances have 
been widely employed in the Gulf of Mexico by transnational corporations such as 
Chevron and Royal Dutch Shell, as well as NOCs like Petrobras and Petróleos de 
Venezuela for decades. However, Pemex has been largely remiss in the procurement of 
such technologically advanced capital resources, as high levels of taxation and 
disadvantageous budgetary constraints imposed on Pemex by the Mexican government 
has dissuaded, in fact prohibited, the acquisition of such costly material assets. Moreover, 
the end of “easy oil” in Mexico, largely marked by the depletion of reserves at Cantarell, 
served to shed a rather glaring light upon Pemex’ categorical lack of deepwater, or more 
specifically ultradeep water, technological expertise and infrastructure. Not until very 
recently, and this thesis argues as a direct result of the rapid declination of Cantarell, has 
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Pemex earnestly pursued the acquisition of deepwater drilling technology and expertise. 
This behavior is consistent with Leonardo Maugeri’s observation that since abundant 
amounts of conventional oil has been easily accessible for most of the industry’s history, 
there has been little incentive for sizeable investment in innovative technologies and 
drilling techniques. He further contends that as the “easy oil” is depleted, the pursuit of 
advanced technologies and techniques will ensue, thus increasing reserve levels as 
undiscovered and unconventional sources become more readily accessible.87 Consistent 
with Maugeri’s contentions, Pemex procured a sixth generation deepwater oilrig, 
Centenario, in 2008. This is the first such deepwater oilrig in the Pemex arsenal. 
Additionally, Pemex has recently awarded contracts for the procurement of four 
additional platforms, which are scheduled to come online as soon as late 2011. However, 
observers like Milton Costa, a representative for Petrobras in Mexico, contend that it is 
not simply enough to “purchase technology,” but rather it is the management of expertise 
on those technologies that matters.88 It should also be noted that these projects have been 
continuously postponed for a myriad of reasons, namely a weakness at the middle 
management level within Pemex. Pemex Exploración y Producción (PEP), the internal 
arm of the company tasked with the acquisition of new equipment and with the 
development of new oilfields, has very limited experience in evaluating and managing 
operational risks.89 This managerial inexperience has become increasingly evident when 
Pemex contracted transnational oil firm Royal Dutch Shell to drill a perspective oilfield. 
Pemex leadership, out of their depth managerially, did not provide Shell with the 
requisite geological survey of the area, as is normal industry practice. Instead, Pemex 
merely advised Shell to drill in a specified area, and complained when no oil was  
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discovered.90 This inefficiency has repeatedly cost Pemex valuable time and resources, 
and is proof that Grayson’s argument of “wildcat drilling” continues to hold true at 
Pemex.  
Additionally, and while possibly overly simplistic, it cannot be overstated that 
deepwater and ultradeep drilling are highly cost prohibitive endeavors, with a steep and 
lengthy learning curve. It took decades for Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell, and Petrobras – 
the world’s leading deepwater companies – to develop and institutionalize the technical 
expertise required to drill and produce in deepwater.91 Pemex is attempting to overcome 
both of these challenges in a rather short time span, and worse yet, with a weak business 
culture still intact. To date, Pemex has more than 15-projected deepwater and ultradeep 
water drilling exploration projects scheduled for commencement (see Figure 5). Some 
experts and observers have criticized these endeavors of being overly aggressive and 
lacking in focus, especially given Pemex’ lack of technical expertise in deepwater 
drilling. Dr. Lourdes Melgar, an independent oil consultant and former Director of 
International Affairs for the Mexican Secretariat of Energy (SENER), censures Pemex’ 
undertakings as “Like trying to go to Mars before first going to the moon.”92 
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Figure 5. Current and Projected Deepwater and Ultradeep Water Exploration in 
Gulf of Mexico (in meters)93 
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, EXPOSING INEFFICIENCY 
To provide a brief contrast and a more clearly articulated illustration of Pemex’ 
operational and managerial inefficiency, this thesis will examine Pemex’ 2009 annual 
report and statistics against those of Brazil’s nationally owned oil company (NOC) 
Petrobras. By solely examining their respective number of total employees (see Table 3), 
it is clearly evident that Petrobras operates at much greater efficiency than does Pemex. 
While both firms produce largely equal amounts of barrels per day and total revenues, 
Petrobras is able to achieve these numbers with nearly half the workforce. Additionally, 
despite the vast potential for lucrative resources in the Gulf of Mexico, Pemex has no 
deepwater and ultradeep water production; while Petrobras has distinguished itself as a 
world leader in deepwater drilling and production, now accounting for almost 22% of 
global deepwater production today.94 At the risk of speculating, this stark contrast raises 
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the question as to whether this disparity in institutional knowledge is due to the fact the 
Petrobras was not “blessed” with a Cantarell, and therefore had no choice but to hone 
their deepwater proficiency and innovation in order to remain competitive. 
 
 2009 Financial Statement, Pemex and Petrobras 
 Total Revenue Net Income Total Assets Barrels per Day (bpd) Total Employees
Pemex $80.7 ($7.01) $102 2.5M 141,466 
Petrobras $91.8 $15.5 $200 2.3M 76,919 
Net Delta $11.1 $22.51 $98.0 0.2M 64,547 
Favors Petrobras Petrobras Petrobras Pemex Petrobras 
Table 3.   2009 Financial Statement, Pemex and Petrobras (in U.S. dollar bn)95 
E. NEW REFINERY, OLD POLITICS 
In an attempt to generate much needed future revenue flow from gasoline sales, 
Pemex announced in April 2009 that it would begin building Mexico’s first new oil 
refinery in 30 years in Tula, Hidalgo.96 The location of the new project has been highly 
criticized as being more of a political maneuver in nature by the ruling PAN party, or 
pork barrel spending, than a sound business decision promising greater returns. President 
Calderón has responded to such criticism by insisting that the Tula location was chosen 
because of its primary competitive advantage, its close proximity to Mexico City (the 
country’s center of consumption for refined petrol), and therefore, presented the lowest 
transport cost and required less pipeline infrastructure than other competing locations. In 
addition to accusations of “pork barrel” spending and political favoritism, this project has 
also been criticized by the private sector for investing public funds into refining facilities 
rather than into exploration, as it is the general consensus that “the best use of cash flow 
is to use it to explore for more oil.”97 While Pemex’s internal figures forecast a rate of 
return of 17.5% annually for the Tula refinery, a considerable amount, it is dwarfed when 
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compared to the 100% plus returns earned from striking new oilfields.98 President 
Calderón has resolutely defended the Tula refinery project, asserting that building this 
refinery will invite the private sector to build refineries. This of course, is contingent 
upon if his administration can get their energy reform proposals approved through the 
congress, thereby allowing for private investment in Mexico’s oil sector; these recent 
attempts to reform Mexico’s energy sector are examined in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
It is worth noting that the Tula refinery is projected to cost in excess of US$9.2B 
and is, by far, the largest infrastructure project to be undertaken by the Calderón 
administration to date.99 This project was an especially risky endeavor for the Calderón 
administration, and stirs up echoes of Vicente Fox’s ill-fated 2001 proposition to build a 
new Mexico City airport in Texcoco (located in the State of Mexico). Like the Texcoco 
venture, the Tula refinery required 700 hectares of agricultural land and the subsequent 
eviction of thousands of ejidatarios (peasant workers) off the land. In August 2009, the 
state of Hidalgo was able to secure the land and the refinery is scheduled to be 
operational sometime in 2015.100 Regrettably, the project was brought to a standstill 
when a pipeline running from the port of Dos Bocas, Tabasco to a preexisting Tula 
refinery exploded and killed 28 in December 2010. The explosion was blamed on a 
“criminal gang” who was attempting to siphon off fuel from the pipeline.101 Pemex 
estimates that it loses in excess of US$700M annually to oil theft;102 however, a recent 
police raid of Pemex’ headquarters and ensuing governmental audit placed that number at 
more than US$2B a year in theft.103 
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F. EXTERNAL ECONOMIC FACTORS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
While waning oil production and energy sector reform are certainly toward the 
forefront of the Mexican government’s agenda, arguably the most pressing issues for 
Mexico today are drugs and violence. While the recent recession north of the border, 
coupled with diminishing oil revenues, propelled Mexico’s economy into a deep 
recession in 2009, the situation was further exacerbated by the drug-related violence and 
explicit activity.104 This violence, which has included murders, kidnappings, and political 
intimidation namely along Mexico’s northern territory, has become an almost all-
consuming battle for the Calderón administration. Mexico’s inability to counter the 
sectarian violence of warring drug cartels effectively, along with its subsequent 
floundering economy, have brought this once docile neighboring nation to the forefront 
of U.S. security concerns. In fact, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recently rated 
Mexico as an equal threat to U.S. national security as Iran, and more of a potential 
problem than Iraq. Shortly after the publication of this article, the U.S. National 
Intelligence Director clarified that no plans had yet been drawn up for the deployment of 
ground troops into Mexico, and emphasized that U.S. strategy was to simply to bolster 
Mexican forces. The Mexican Interior Minister quickly rebutted such reports, contending 
that the United States was “panicking” over Mexico’s present situation.105 ADM Mike 
Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been one of the few vocal individuals 
within the Obama administration to echo such concerns regarding Mexico as a national 
security threat and has recently advised the President in ways the U.S. military can assist 
Mexico in combating the drug violence that plague many of its cities.106 Only recently 
has President Calderón publically conceded that his strategy “may need to be 
reworked.”107 These facts are included in this thesis to illustrate the myriad of difficulties 
currently facing the Mexican state. 
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In an attempt to curb the negative effects of waning oil fiscal revenues, the 
Mexican government has recently, and rather hastily, implemented several austerity 
programs in an attempt to reduce public spending. However, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is headed by the former 
Mexican Finance Minister Angel Gurria, strongly advised Mexican policymakers against 
constricting fiscal policy. The OECD contends that hastily promoting such fiscal austerity 
will likely intensify the effects of the recession and aggravate public sentiment.108 One of 
the many fiscal problems facing President Calderón is a fiscal spending law, Ley Federal 
de Presupuesto y Responsibilidad Hacendaria, put in place by his predecessor Vicente 
Fox. This law prohibits the Mexican government from running a fiscal deficit. While this 
new policy was not an issue when Mr. Fox signed it into law in 2006, as oil prices and 
state revenues soared by 90% in real terms from 2000 to 2008, it has proven to be 
shortsighted in the face of recent revenue shortfalls.109 As a result, the Mexican state is 
confronted with the dilemma of whether to cut public programs or increase taxes. While 
top officials within the administration call for higher taxes, like Agustin Carstens, 
Mexico’s former finance minister and now Chairman of the Banco de Mexico, levying 
new taxes may prove politically unrealistic seeing as how no Mexican government has 
held a congressional majority since the PRI in 1997.110 It should be noted that while the 
PAN boasts itself as a fiscally responsible, right of center party, public spending has 
almost doubled since the last year of a non-PAN administration, increasing from M$1.4T 
in 2000 to M$2.24T in 2008 (presented in 2009 pesos). Additionally, while the Mexican 
economy no longer relies exclusively on oil revenues, oil currently represents 
approximately 4% of GDP, it does, however, rely on oil for public fiscal expenditures. 
The loss of oil revenues, coupled with external economic factors have served to reveal 
the stark realization that an effective, non-partisan and autonomous tax collection agency 
is required, such a state apparatus is blatantly deficient in Mexico to date.  
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G. OIL REFORMS? 
On paper, the Mexican Secretariat of Energy (SENER) regulates Pemex, however 
in reality and historically, this has never been the case.111 As the Secretary of Energy in 
Vicente Fox’s cabinet, Felipe Calderón was all too aware of this reality and of the 
impending energy sector dilemmas facing Mexico when he assumed the presidency in 
2006. Since taking office, he has made Pemex’ task exceedingly clear, “create economic 
value for the benefit of the Nation.”112 Accordingly, in 2008, the Calderón administration 
introduced a proposed energy reform bill before the Mexican Congress. Given the 
politically contentious nature of oil reform in Mexico, as discussed in previous chapters, 
this move was, indeed, a bold one. Calderón’s proposal made it abundantly clear that his 
initiative would include no change to the constitution, no privatization of Pemex, and 
would not seek to diminish the STPRM as other administrations had. However, “the 
initiative took into account what was politically feasible and not what was actually 
necessary to tackle the crisis looming in Pemex.”113 In November 2008, after months of 
political deliberation that included numerous filibusters, Mexico’s energy sector bill was 
issued, but the resulting reform had been heavily “watered down” by the Congress. 
Newly introduced policy reform allowing for partnership with foreign firms for the 
exploration and development of new oilfields has been tepid at best.114 While debates 
and discussions continue in Mexico vis-à-vis its oil sector, the hope of any meaningful 
energy reform has been largely paralyzed by democratic stalemate. The PRI, which 
controls 237 of the 500 seats in the lower house, has adamantly and vocally opposed any 
further reforms of Pemex, likely diminishing the possibility for any acute energy reform 
in the near future. The PRI’s selection of Francisco Rojas Gutierrez, former Director 
General of Pemex, as its leader in the lower chamber of congress is a clear indication of 
the party’s intention to make oil reform a top political priority. Furthermore, his selection 
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makes it even less probable that Mr. Calderón will see any additional or consequential 
energy reforms passed before his term expires in 2012. All the while, Pemex’s oil 
production continues to plummet, decreasing by 215,000 barrels per day from 2008 to 
2009 alone. For the first time since the discovery of the Cantarell oilfield, Mexico is 
showing a hydrocarbons exchange balance of less than one million barrels a day.115 More 
pointedly, this decrease in output translates into $5.1B in lost annual revenues.116 It 
should be noted, however, that while the approved energy reforms are arguably 
insufficient, they are still in their infancy. Therefore, it may be too early to evaluate their 
impact fully. Lastly, this political debate has thus far been regrettably remiss in 
addressing two serious and necessary dialogues; fiscal and tax reform. To date, the 
Mexican government relies on oil revenues to provide for 35-40% of their fiscal budget. 
While tax reform is unquestionably a hugely unpopular political topic, some would argue 
that it is politically suicidal; the fact stands that expanding Mexico’s tax base would 
allow it to generate alternative fiscal revenues and partially alleviate their fiscal 
dependency on oil. However politically disagreeable, Mexico cannot promote sustained 
economic growth and development without reforming its negligent tax and fiscal policy. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Chapter III of this thesis has presented an overview of the numerous 
contemporary challenges facing Mexico’s oil industry. It addressed the relational 
comparison between Pemex and the Brazilian, state-owned oil firm Petrobras in order to 
provide a comparative evaluation of their respective ability to operate at varying levels of 
production and efficiency. It argued that since large pockets of oil reserves located in 
shallow waters, which have thus been referred to as “easy oil,” were not available to 
Petrobras, they were required to drill to further depths in search of lucrative reserves; 
thus developing their deepwater operating proficiency and continuously modernizing 
their infrastructure. In short, Petrobras was not endowed with a Cantarell, and therefore, 
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was forced to improve its operational efficiency and organizational technical 
knowledgebase in order to remain competitive in a global market. Additionally, this 
chapter asserted that unlike Pemex, Petrobras’ foreign partnerships and corporate 
alliances were not overwhelmingly constrained by constitutional mandates; this increased 
structural flexibility allowed Petrobras to develop and institutionalize best industry 
practices at as an accelerated rate. “The legacy of nationalism in Mexico vis-à-vis oil has 
perhaps most importantly denied Pemex partnership opportunities with international 
firms, which would have greatly benefitted it by access to technology, know-how, and 
fiscal and management efficiencies.”117 In stark contrast to one another, Petrobras is 
today a global industry leader in terms of offshore deepwater drilling, able to drill at 
depths in excess of 3,000m; while Pemex has only recently surpassed the 1,000m mark. 
This statistic stands as perhaps the most revealing disparity with regard to the deepwater 
technological capability between these two firms. 
Additionally, this chapter addressed the energy reforms recently passed by the 
Mexican government. It contended that these reforms were largely inadequate to deal 
with the mounting problems facing the Mexican oil industry. Furthermore, democratic 
debate and political maneuvering within the Mexican Congress have resulted in a 
political impasse. Again demonstrating that oil and oil reform is a highly contentious 
political hot button in Mexico, able to stir up nationalistic passions. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Recent efforts by the Calderón government to enact energy sector reform have 
again proven that, in Mexico, oil continues to be a politically incendiary and socially 
divisive topic. The resulting initiatives, after considerable internal negotiations within the 
federal government, have been largely criticized as tepid, at best, and for having only 
accounted for what was politically achievable and not what was actually needed to 
address and combat the crisis.118 Additionally, the most contentious facets of these 
reforms have been challenged in court as unconstitutional.119 At the time of writing this 
thesis, the courts had yet to render a ruling concerning their constitutionality. It should be 
noted, however, that while these initiatives have yet to result in significant energy sector 
reform necessary for addressing the crisis at hand, they do, in fact, mark the first time that 
the Mexican executive, congress, private sector, and civil society have all participated in 
a comprehensive (and inclusive) dialogue regarding the state of their oil sector. This 
thesis has analyzed the political shift in Mexico from authoritarianism to democracy in 
order to emphasize vast influence this shift in political landscape has had on this 
contemporary oil crisis. “The problem is no longer too much power in the hands of the 
president, but too much power seized by those who want to sabotage and constrain 
him.”120 Mexico is now faced with the stark reality that institutional change, particularly 
within a democracy, is a slow and lengthy process. Dr. Lourdes Melgar, former Director 
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It is impossible for a new legal structure to rapidly reverse years of 
abandonment of the oil industry. Today, Pemex is struggling as a result of 
years of financial exploitation, appalling underinvestment, poor decision-
making, and a governmental policy of short-term benefits to the detriment 
of the health and viability of the oil company, which has been run not as 
an enterprise but as an infinite source of revenue for the government.121 
In addition, the 1976 discovery of the supergiant Cantarell oil field in the Bay of 
Campeche set Mexico’s oil industry on a path dependent course and served to further 
solidify the operational inefficiencies, political mismanagement, and lack of 
institutionalized technological prowess within its state-owned oil giant, Pemex. Despite 
these considerable shortcomings, Pemex was able to produce massive quantities of oil 
continually, and the Mexican state came to rely heavily on the associated revenues 
generated. In this case, Mexico clearly fell prey to the so-called “resource curse,” as 
Cantarell’s easily accessible reserves and subsequent windfall of revenues retarded 
Mexico’s institutional and structural development, as well as Pemex’s managerial 
maturity and need for technological advancement. Cantarell’s overall significance and 
harmful structural influence leading to Mexico’s current oil crisis cannot be overstated or 
overlooked. Its copious, easily accessible, and seemingly infinite oil reserves allowed, in 
fact incentivized, myopic behavior and policy to permeate throughout Mexico’s oil 
industry; and paradoxically, setting forth the lasting effects of the easy oil hangover to 
which Mexico is currently awakening. For the first time since 1981, the initial year of 
Cantarell production, Mexico is registering hydrocarbon balances of less than one million 
barrels per day and is forecasted to become a net importer of oil by 2020 unless new 
reserves are tapped and exploited.122 Cantarell, the once abundant supergiant and source 
of Mexican oil industry prestige, appears to be in its final stages of existence, as does 
Mexico’s petro golden age.  
 
                                                 
121 Melgar, “Energy Transition: A Path Toward Sustainable Development in Mexico,” 101. 
122 Adrián Lajous, “Mexican Oil and Gas Policies” (presented at the University of Chicago’s 
International and Area Studies Multimedia Outreach Source (CHIASMOS), Chicago, Illinois, March 4, 
2009). 
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Additionally, since Pemex, which has become “a byword for inefficiency and 
corruption,” categorically lacks the technological expertise required to tap newly 
discovered deepwater reserves located along the Mexican portion of the Gulf of Mexico, 
the Mexican government may have little choice but to loosen its long-standing 
protectionist policies and allow for private sector investment into its state owned oil 
industry.123 In all, the Mexican state has appropriated a total of $12.2B through 2015 for 
the procurement of new technologies and equipment, building new refineries and 
expanding existing facilities. The bulk of this appropriation is to be financed by Pemex. 
Today, an impressive, large bronze statue of Lázaro Cárdenas stands ever vigilant 
at the base of Pemex’ massive 50-story corporate headquarters in Mexico City. A 
formidable and constant reminder that, in Mexico, oil remains an emblem of national 
sovereignty. 
  
                                                 
123 “Cordero Claims New Oil Contracts Imminent,” Latin American Weekly Report, WR-10-03 
(January 21, 2010): 13. 
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